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I. INTRODUCTION

I
MAGINE some party wants to commit to a set , in a way such that any other party can "access" in a limited but reliable manner. By limited here we mean that is given indirect access to , in the sense that she is allowed to ask only questions of the form "is in ?". answers such questions by providing publicly verifiable proofs for the statements (or ). Such proofs should be reliable in the sense that a cheating should not be able to convince that some is in the set while is not (or vice versa). At the same time, they should be "discreet" enough not to reveal anything beyond their validity. The notion of zero knowledge sets (ZKS) was recently introduced by Micali, Rabin, and Kilian [20] to address exactly this problem. Informally, ZKS allow a prover to commit to an arbitrary (but finite) set in a way such that can later prove statements of the form or without revealing any significant information about (not even its size!). As already pointed out in [20] , the notion of ZKS can be easily extended to encompass the more general notion of elementary databases (EDB). In a nutshell, an elementary database is a set with the additional property that each comes with an associated value . In the following we will refer to ZKS to include Zero-Knowledge EDB as well.
The solution by Micali et al. is non interactive and works in the so called shared random string model (i.e., where a random string, built by some trusted third party, is made available to all participants) building upon a very clever utilization of a simple commitment scheme, originally proposed by Pedersen [26] .
Commitment schemes play a central role in cryptography. Informally, they can be seen as the digital equivalent of an opaque envelope. Whatever is put inside the envelope remains secret until the latter is opened (hiding property) and whoever creates the commitment should not be able to open it with a message that is not the one originally inserted (binding property). Typically, a commitment scheme is a two phase procedure. During the first phase, the sender creates a commitment , to some message , using an appropriate commitment algorithm, and sends to the receiver . In the opening phase the sender opens by giving all the necessary material to (efficiently) verify that was indeed a valid commitment to . Since Pedersen's commitment relies on the intractability of the discrete logarithm, so does the construction in [20] . Later, Chase et al. [6] abstracted away Micali et al.'s solution and described the exact properties a commitment scheme should possess in order to allow a similar construction. This led to an elegant new variant of commitments, that they called mercurial commitment.
Informally, a mercurial commitment is a commitment scheme where the binding requirement is somewhat relaxed in order to allow for two decommitment procedures: an hard and a soft one. At committing time, the sender can decide as whether to create an hard commitment or a soft one, from the message he has in mind. Hard commitments are like standard ones, in the sense that they can be (hard or soft) opened only with respect to the message that was originally used to construct the commitment. Soft commitments, on the other hand, allow for more freedom, as they cannot be hard opened in any way, but they can be soft opened to any arbitrary message. An important requirement of mercurial commitments is that, hard and soft commitments should look alike to any polynomially bounded observer.
Using this new primitive, Chase et al. proved that it is possible to construct ZKS from a variety of assumptions (number theoretic or general). 1 Their most general implementation, shows that (non interactive) ZKS can be constructed, in the shared random string model, assuming non interactive zero knowledge proofs (NIZK) [2] and collision resistant hash functions [9] . 2 Moreover, they showed that collision resistant hash functions are necessary to construct ZKS, as they are implied by the latter. Finally, Catalano, Dodis, and Visconti [4] gave a construction of (trapdoor) mercurial commitments from one way functions in the shared random string model. This result completed the picture as it showed that collision resistant hash functions are necessary and sufficient for non interactive ZKS in the shared random string model. OUR CONTRIBUTION. All the constructions above, build upon the common idea of constructing an authenticated Merkle tree of depth where each internal node is a mercurial commitment (rather than the hash) of its two children. Very informally, to prove that a given belongs to the committed set , the prover simply opens all the commitments in the path from the root to the leaf labeled by (more details about this methodology will be given later on). Thus the length of the resulting proof is , where denotes the length of the opening of the mercurial commitment, and has to be chosen so that is larger than the size of any "reasonably" large set . 3 Assuming and , as it is the case for all known implementations, this often leads to very long proofs.
It is thus important to research if using the properties of specific number-theoretic problems, it is possible to devise zero knowledge sets that allow for shorter proofs. Such proofs would be desirable in all those scenarios where space or bandwidth are limited. A typical example of such a scenario is mobile internet connections, where customers pay depending on the number of blocks sent and received.
In this paper, we present a new construction of ZKS that allows for much shorter proofs, with respect to the best currently known implementation (which is the Micali et al. construction when implemented on certain classes of elliptic curves. From now on we will use the acronym MRK to refer to such an implementation). As shown in Section V, the proposed construction keeps a practical interest with a good time efficiency as proved by some experimental tests.
Our solution relies on a new primitive that we call trapdoor q-Mercurial Commitment ( , for short). Informally, s allow the sender to commit to a sequence of exactly messages , rather than to a single one, as with standard mercurial commitments. The sender can later open the commitment with respect to any message but, in order to do so successfully, he has to correctly specify the exact position held by the message in the sequence. In other words, trapdoor q-Mercurial commitments allow to commit to ordered sequences of messages. Following [6] and [20] , we show how to construct ZKS from s and collision resistant hash functions. This step is rather simple but very useful for our goal, as it reduces the task of realizing efficient ZKS to the task of realizing efficient s. Indeed, even though the proposed transformation allows us to use a "flat" Merkle tree (i.e., with branching factor , rather than two), it does not lead, by itself, to shorter proofs.
Recall that, informally, a proof for the statement (or ) consists of an authenticated path from the root to the leaf labeled by . The trouble is that in all known implementations of ZKS, to verify the authenticity of a node in the path, one must know all siblings of the node. If the tree is binary, the proof contains twice as many nodes as the depth of the tree (since each node must be accompanied by its sibling). Thus, the length of a proof being proportional to the branching factor of the tree, increasing the latter, is actually a bad idea in general. Indeed, suppose we want to consider sets defined over a universe of elements. Using a binary authentication tree one gets proofs whose length is proportional to , where is the size of the authentication information contained in each node. Using a tree with branching degree , on the other hand, one would get proofs of size , which is actually more than in previous case. OVERCOMING THE PROOFS BLOW-UP. In this paper we propose an implementation of trapdoor mercurial commitments that overcomes the above limitation. Our solution relies on the so-called Strong Diffie Hellman (SDH) assumption originally introduced by Boneh and Boyen [3] and builds upon the weakly secure digital signature given in [3] . The proposed implementation exploits the algebraic properties of the employed number theoretic primitive to produce a that allows for short openings. More precisely, the size of each hard opening still depends linearly on , but the size of each soft opening becomes constant and completely independent of . This results in ZKS that allow for much shorter proofs than MRK. Concretely, and for an appropriate choice of the parameter , our proofs are up to 33% shorter for the case of proofs of membership, and up to 73% shorter for the case of proofs of non membership.
In addition, we provide a more detailed comparison between the MRK scheme and the ours by giving an implementation of both schemes. We ran experimental tests to measure their performances in terms of time efficiency and the results of such experiments showed that our proposal is widely practical in time efficiency and it is even better in some operations when compared with MRK.
ZKS VERSUS SIGNATURES. The idea of obtaining short proofs by changing the authentication procedure to deal with a "flat" authentication tree, is reminiscent of a technique originally suggested by Dwork and Naor [10] , in the context of digital signature schemes. In a nutshell, the Dwork-Naor method allows to increase the branching factor of the tree without inflating the signature size. This is achieved by, basically, authenticating each node with respect to its parent, but without providing its siblings.
Adapting this idea to work to the case of zero knowledge sets presents several non trivial technical difficulties 4 . The main problem comes from the fact that, in ZKS, one has to make sure that a dishonest prover cannot construct two, both valid, proofs for the statements and . Such a requirement imposes limitations just not present when dealing with digital signatures.
OTHER RELATED WORK. Very recently Libert and Yung [15] solved the problem left open in [5] of having s where hard openings are of size independent of . The construction proposed in [15] is based on the -DHE assumption and allows to build ZKS where even membership proofs can be made shorter by increasing the branching factor of the tree.
Ostrovsky, Rackoff, and Smith [26] described a construction that allows a prover to commit to a database and to provide answers that are consistent with the commitment. Their solution can handle more elaborate queries than just membership ones. Moreover they also consider the issue of adding privacy to their protocol. However their construction requires interaction (at least if one wants to avoid the use of random oracles) and requires the prover to keep a counter for the questions asked so far.
Gennaro and Micali introduced in [12] the notion of independent zero knowledge sets. Informally, independent ZKS protocols prevent an adversary from successfully correlate her set to the one of a honest prover. Their notion of independence also implies that the resulting ZKS protocol is nonmalleable and requires a new commitment scheme that is both independent and mercurial. We do not consider such an extension here.
Liskov [18] considered the problem of updating zero-knowledge databases. In [18] definitions for updatable zero knowledge databases are given, together with a construction based on verifiable random functions [21] and mercurial commitments. The construction, however, is in the random oracle model [1] .
Prabhakaran and Xue [27] introduced the notion of statistically hiding sets (SHS) that is related but different than ZKS. Informally, SHS require the hiding property to hold with respect to unbounded verifiers. At the same time, however, they relax the zero knowledge requirement to allow for unbounded simulators.
Finally it may be of interest to observe that the accumulator proposed by Nguyen in [22] has a construction similar to our -mercurial commitment scheme. ROAD MAP. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the notion of trapdoor mercurial commitments and provide the relevant definitions for zero knowledge sets. Section III is devoted to the construction of ZKS from trapdoor mercurial commitments. In Section IV, we show how to construct efficient s from the SDH Assumption. A formal and experimental efficiency analysis is given in Section V. Finally, conclusions and directions for future work are given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES Before presenting our results, we briefly recall some basic definitions. In what follows we will denote with a security parameter. Denote with the set of natural numbers and with the set of positive real numbers. We say that a function is negligible if and only if for every positive polynomial there exists a such that for all . If is a set, we write to indicate the process of selecting uniformly at random in . Let be a probabilistic algorithm. We denote with the process of running and assigning its output to .
A. Trapdoor q-Mercurial Commitments
Informally, a trapdoor q-mercurial commitment ( for brevity) extends the notion of (trapdoor) mercurial commitment, by allowing the sender to commit to an (ordered) sequence of messages, rather than to a single one. More precisely, and like standard (trapdoor) mercurial commitments (whose definition is given in Appendix A), trapdoor -mercurial commitments allow for two different decommitting procedures. In addition to the standard opening mechanism, there is a partial opening (also referred as tease or soft open) algorithm that allows for some sort of equivocation. At committing stage, the sender can decide to produce a commitment in two ways. Hard commitments should be hiding in the usual sense, but should satisfy a very strong binding requirement (that we call strong binding). Informally, strong binding means that a sender should be able to open a commitment only with respect to messages that were in the "correct" position in the sequence originally committed to. More precisely, when opening an hard commitment for a message , the sender is required to specify an index , indicating the position of in the sequence. In the case of hard commitments, the strong binding property imposes that the commitment should be successfully opened and teased to only if was the th message in the sequence originally committed to. Soft commitments, on the other hand cannot be opened, but can be teased with respect to messages belonging to any arbitrary sequence of messages.
More formally, a trapdoor -mercurial commitment is defined by the following set of algorithms: ( ).
• : is a probabilistic algorithm that takes in input a security parameter and the number of committed values and outputs a pair of public/private keys . This algorithm is usually run by a trusted party that makes the public key available to all parties that want to use the scheme.
• : given an ordered tuple of messages, computes a hard commitment to using the public key and returns some auxiliary value containing all the information used to generate .
• : let , if the hard opening algorithm produces a hard decommitment . The algorithm returns an error message otherwise.
• : the hard verification algorithm accepts (outputs 1) only if proves that is created to a tuple such that .
• : produces a soft commitment and an auxiliary information . A soft commitment string is created to no specific sequence of messages.
• : produces a soft decommitment (also known as "tease") to a message at position . The parameter indicates if corresponds to either a hard commitment or to a soft commitment . The algorithm returns an error message if is an hard commitment and .
•
: checks if is a valid decommitment for to of index . If it outputs 1 and corresponds to a hard commitment to , then could be hard-opened to , or rather .
• : takes as input the trapdoor and produces a -fake commitment . is not bound to any sequence . It also returns an auxiliary information .
• : the non-adaptive hard equivocation algorithm generates a hard decommitment for to the -th message of . The algorithm is non adaptive in the sense that, for a given , the sequence has to be determined once and for all, before is executed. A -fake commitment is very similar to a soft commitment with the additional property that it can be hard-opened.
• : the soft equivocation algorithm generates a soft decommitment to of position using the auxiliary information produced by the algorithm. We notice that it does not need to have the entire commitment sequence to be specified in input. The correctness requirements for trapdoor -Mercurial commitments are essentially the same as those for "traditional" commitment schemes. In particular we require that for all public keys generated by and , the following statements are false only with negligible probability.
1) if :
2) if
The security properties for a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme are as follows:
• -Mercurial binding. Having knowledge of it is computationally infeasible for a PPT algorithm to come up with such that either one of the following cases holds: -is a valid hard decommitment for to and is a valid hard decommitment for to , with . We call such case a "hard collision." -is a valid hard decommitment for to and is a valid soft decommitment for to , with . We call such case a "soft collision." • -Mercurial hiding. There exists no PPT adversary that, knowing , can find a tuple for which it can distinguish from , where and .
• Equivocations. In the following games should not be able to tell apart the "real" world from the corresponding "ideal" one. The games are formalized in terms of a challenger that flips a binary coin . If it gives to a real commitment/decommitment tuple; if it gives to an ideal tuple produced using the fake algorithms.
-q-HEquivocation. , gives them to the challenger and gets back for all . At the end of each game outputs a bit as its guess for and we define its advantage as (for X=H, S, respectively). Then we say that such properties hold is no PPT adversary has nonnegligible advantage in any of the above games. As for the case of trapdoor mercurial commitments (see [4] ) it is easy to see that the -mercurial hiding is implied by the -HEquivocation and -SEquivocation. Moreover if a scheme is proper in the sense of [4] , then the -HEquivocation property can be simplified by giving to the adversary only hard openings since the soft ones are given implicitly. Indeed, we recall that a mercurial commitment scheme is said proper if the soft opening is a proper subset of the hard opening.
RELATION TO THE DEFINITION IN [5] . In this paper, we slightly change the definition of equivocations with respect to the one given in [5] . The first modification is in that here the adversary of the hiding and equivocations games is allowed to see the openings for all the indices. Indeed we noticed that the previous definition (where the adversary is given the opening for only one index) is not sufficient for proving the zero-knowledge property in the generic construction of ZKS from s.
Then we propose a new -HEquivocation property instead of the previous -HHEquivocation and -HSEquivocation. The point is that the previous definition allows to build ZKS only if the scheme is proper. 5 More precisely, from a theoretical point of view, it does not change much as any non-proper scheme can be converted into a proper one by defining the hard opening as the hard opening plus the soft opening. Though our construction of Section IV is proper, we prefer to have a statement valid for all kinds of schemes, also because the generic conversion sketched above, may not be efficient. In contrast our new definition allows to build ZKS directly without any requirement on the properness of the scheme. Finally we remark that the same observation can be made in the case of standard mercurial commitments. We propose new equivocations definitions also for them and we discuss the relationship with the previous definition in Appendix A.
B. Generic Construction of Trapdoor -Mercurial Commitments
In this section, we show that trapdoor -mercurial commitments exist under the very basic assumption that one-way functions exist. Indeed, from the result of Catalano et al. [4] we know that mercurial commitments exist assuming the existence of one-way functions in the common reference string model.
Therefore a trivial solution is to define a trapdoor -mercurial commitment as an ordered sequence of mercurial commitments. In order to commit to a sequence of messages the committer creates as the commitment to message using the mercurial commitment scheme and then defines . Later, when it wants to open to at position , it opens to . It is easy to see that this -mercurial commitment scheme is secure if so is the underlying scheme. Therefore, putting together this scheme and the result of Catalano et al. [4] we have that trapdoor -mercurial commitments can be built assuming only the existence of one-way functions in the common reference string model.
It is clear that the solution given above is not very efficient since the size of the commitment string is linear in . A more space-efficient generic construction can be instantiated assuming the existence of collision resistant hash functions. To commit to a sequence of messages use the mercurial commitment scheme to create commitments and then construct a Merkle tree upon the commitments as leaves. In particular observe that the path from the root until each leaf uniquely defines its position in the sequence. The commitment will be the root of the tree. Later, to open to at position , open to and then "open" the path from until the root. In this case, the commitment string is constant and independent from , while the opening cost is .
C. Zero-Knowledge Sets
ZKS [20] allow one to commit to some secret set and then to, noninteractively, produce proofs of the form or . 5 While such statement may be unclear at this stage, it will become more clever when looking at the proof in Section III.B. This is done without revealing any further information (i.e., that cannot be deduced by the statements above) about , not even its size. Following the approach of [20] , here we focus on the more general notion of zero-knowledge elementary databases (EDB), since the notion of ZKS is a special case of zero-knowledge EDBs (see [20] for more details about this). Let be the set of keys associated to a database . We assume that is a proper subset of . If , we denote with its associated value in the database . If we let . An EDB system is formally defined by the following tuple of algorithms : • takes in input the security parameter and generates the common reference string together with some trapdoor information . This algorithm is run by some trusted party that makes available to all parties that will be going to use the EDB system.
• , the committer algorithm, takes in input the common reference string , a database and outputs a public key and a secret key . • On input the common reference string , the public key , the secret key (which implicitly contains a description of ) and an element , the prover algorithm produces a proof of either or . • Game Real. In this game a common reference string is generated according to the algorithm and the security parameter and is allowed to choose a database and give it to the prover. Then the adversary receives a public key from the prover (computed using ). Finally, it adaptively chooses a sequence of database keys for which it wants to see proofs for the correct values in : . Thus 's view in this game is . . .
• Game Ideal. In this game we consider the case of an adversary interacting with an ideal prover . outputs a common reference string together with a trapdoor information . As in the real game, the adversary, after receiving , chooses a database , but now the simulator algorithm generates a "fake" public key without the knowledge of . Then the adversary adaptively chooses a sequence of elements for which it wants to see the correct proofs. The queries are answered by that is assumed to have access to an oracle that, queried on a key , returns the correct value associated to in the database if , otherwise it returns . We stress about the fact that the simulator is allowed to query the database oracle only on the same keys queried by the adversary. The view of in this game is . . . 6 Chase et al. [6] pointed out the necessity of quantifying only on efficiently computable databases in order to achieve computational ZK. For example a database may contain information needed to break the computational assumption used or to distinguish the generated transcript. In this case an adversary will be able to distinguish the real prover from the simulator. Notice that we consider a notion of completeness that is less restrictive than the one suggested in [20] . Indeed, the definition given in [20] requires perfect completeness. Informally, such a requirement, prescribes that completeness is satisfied with probability 1 (rather than , as in our case). We prefer to consider the less restrictive notion as it allows for more efficient solutions in practice.
III. ZERO KNOWLEDGE EDB FROM TRAPDOOR Q-MERCURIAL COMMITMENTS
In this section, we describe a construction of zero-knowledge EDB, from trapdoor -mercurial commitments (defined in Section II-A), trapdoor mercurial commitments (see Appendix A) [4] , [6] and collision resistant hash functions. The construction is very simple, as it generalizes easily from the original [6] , [20] constructions. Still, it plays an important role in our quest for efficient zero knowledge sets, as it allows us to concentrate solely on the problem of realizing efficient s.
A. Intuitive Construction
Assume we want to commit to a database with keys of length . We associate each key to a leaf in a -ary tree of height . Thus can be viewed as a number representing the labeling of the leaf in -ary encoding (see the example in Fig. 1 ). Since the number of all possible keys is , to make the committing phase efficient (i.e., polynomial in ) the tree is pruned by cutting those subtrees containing only keys of elements not in the database. The roots of such subtrees are kept in the tree (we call them the "frontier"). The internal nodes in the frontier are "filled" with soft commitments. The remaining nodes are filled as follows. Each leaf contains an hard commitment (computed using the standard trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme) of a value related to 7 . Each internal node contains the hard -commitment to the hashes of the values contained in its sons. The -commitment contained in the root of the tree is the public key of the zero-knowledge EDB.
When the prover is asked for a proof of an element (for instance such that ), it proceeds as follows. It exhibits hard openings for the commitments contained in the nodes in the path from the root to the leaf . More precisely, for each level of the tree, it opens the hard -commitment with respect to the position determined by the -ary encoding of for that level. Queries corresponding to keys such that are answered as follows. First, the prover generates the possibly missing portion of the subtree containing . Next, it soft opens all the commitments contained in the nodes in the path from to the root. The soft commitments stored in the frontier nodes are then teased to the values contained in its newly generated children.
It is easy to see that the completeness property follows from the completeness of the two commitment schemes used. Similarly, the binding properties of the two commitment schemes, together with the collision resistance of the underlying hash function, guarantees that: 1) no hard commitment can be opened to two different values, and 2) no hard commitment can be opened to a value and then teased to a different one.
Finally the zero-knowledge property follows from the fact that both the two commitments schemes are hiding and equivocable (the fake commitments and fake openings produced by the simulator are indistinguishable from the commitments and openings produced from a real prover).
A detailed description of the construction sketched above, together with a complete security proof, is given in the following section.
B. Detailed Construction
Here we give the details of our construction of zero-knowledge EDB from trapdoor -mercurial commitments (see Section II-A), trapdoor mercurial commitments (Appendix A) [4] , [6] and collision resistant hash functions.
Let be the complete -ary tree of height , with leaves. Let be a universe of size (i.e., ). We build its associated tree by labelling its nodes with the -ary encoding of the elements , so that all elements of are leaves in . Thus is the label for the root. If is a nonleaf node, then are its sons. If we consider two subsets of : TREE and FRONTIER . TREE is the subtree of containing all the nodes in the paths from the leaves in to the root (the darker nodes in Fig. 1) .
(the light shaded nodes in Fig. 1) .
We show our construction by describing its algorithms . 7 More precisely n is the hash of D(x) if x is in the database and 0 otherwise.
. Given a security parameter , it constructs the common reference string CRS as follows:
• it generates a pair of (matching) keys for a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme ; • it generates a pair of (matching) keys for a trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme ;
• it chooses a collision-resistant hash function ; . The prover algorithm produces a proof of the database value of . If are two nodes of the tree such that is a son of then we write to refer the position of among the sons of . We distinguish between two cases: 1) . The proof contains the commitments and the hard openings in the path from the leaf-node toward the root with . 2)
. The prover first checks if the leaf node is in the tree constructed by . If , let be the root of the missing subtree of containing . The prover builds the subtree rooted in using the same algorithm as in . The proof contains the commitments and the soft openings in the path from toward the root with . , where is the first node in the path from the root toward . f) If none of the tests above fails output , else output .
1) Proof of Security:
The following theorem proves that the scheme proposed above is a zero-knowledge EDB. The proof may be seen as an extension of the one given in [6] (that supports binary trees and mercurial commitments) to the case of -ary trees and s.
Theorem 1:
Assuming that is a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme, is a trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme and is a family of collision resistant hash functions, the scheme presented above is a zero-knowledge EDB.
Proof: To prove the theorem we prove separately that the scheme satisfies completeness, soundness and the zero-knowledge requirement.
Completeness. We show that completeness is satisfied with overwhelming probability . Such comes from the probability of finding a collision in the hash function . It is easy to check that all tests made by the verifier algorithm are valid for the construction of and and the completeness of both the commitment schemes and . Soundness. We assume there exists an adversary that breaks the soundness of our scheme with nonnegligible advantage . Then we can build a simulator that, with nonnegligible advantage, uses to break either the mercurial binding of the mercurial commitment scheme or the -mercurial binding of the -mercurial commitment scheme or the collision resistance of the hash function. receives in input: • the public key for a mercurial commitment scheme; • the public key for a -mercurial commitment scheme; • the description of a hash function .
constructs the common reference string from the received values and gives it to . With probability the adversary outputs a tuple such that and . Notice that the proofs and have to be different (as they prove different statements). Still they must be both valid. Thus the two proofs have to be the same close to the root, but they must "fork" at some point. This leads to the following, mutually exclusive cases: 1) the commitments are the same but where the forking occurs, they are opened to different values. More specifically we distinguish between two subcases, one for the leaves and another for internal nodes: a) in the leaf-nodes: is of type and of type . In such case the simulator can break either the collision resistance of the hash function (if ) or the mercurial binding of the mercurial commitment scheme . b) for some internal node : and is a hard opening for to and is a hard or soft opening for to . In this case we have a hard or soft collision that breaks the -mercurial binding property of the -mercurial commitment scheme . 2) Where the forking occurs, the commitments are the same, they open to identical values, but the messages were originally different. This means that we found a collision in the hash function: a) in the leaves: , b) for some internal node : ; Zero-Knowledge. In order to show that our generic construction satisfies the zero-knowledge property we first describe a simulator for the ideal game.
is exactly the same as the real algorithm. runs and sets . In order to simulate the first proof for a queried element , the algorithm proceeds as follows: 1) it queries the database oracle on to obtain the correct value ; 2) it sets 3) it makes a fake commitment and sets ; 4) it creates a fake-commitment for each of the siblings of and then computes the corresponding hashes; 5) it creates a fake -commitment for the parent node of the values generated in the two steps before; 6) it creates -fake-commitments, one for each sibling of the node created in the step before; 7) it repeats step 5, 6 until the root.
The proof contains the hard (respectively, soft) equivocations of the commitments in the path from to the root node. Moreover updates the secret key with the values of the newly generated nodes.
When receives subsequent queries, it searches for the last node in the path from the root to present in the currently build tree. Then it works as above to build the nonexistent subtree rooted in . As in the previous case, the proof will contain hard (or soft) equivocations of the commitments in the path from to the root. Once we have defined the simulator for the ideal game we will prove that this game is indistinguishable from the real one as follows. Let us call the Game Real and the Game Ideal played by our simulator. We recall that to formally prove the zero-knowledge property we have to show that for all adversaries the view produced by in Game Real is indistinguishable from the one generated by in Game Ideal (for brevity we write it as ). We prove this with a fairly standard hybrid argument where we define intermediate games in which we change step-by-step our simulator in the way it produces commitments and openings until it will behave like a real prover. Next we show that the difference between two such subsequent games can be reduced to the equivocation properties of the commitment scheme. Finally, since the number of games is at most polynomial, we will obtain the indistinguishability of the two main games and . Given a database , let be the number of nodes in the tree where is defined as before (i.e.,
). Assuming a level-ordering of , for we define to be the tree containing the first nodes of (i.e., and ). Now consider the ideal game and define Game to be modified such that receives in input and both and proceed as follows. All the commitments (and openings) of all the tree nodes revealed by are created as in the case of a real prover (i.e., by using the real algorithms). Instead the remaining ones contain commitments created using the fake algorithms. Then, starting from we can define games for where is the number of keys in . The game is the same as except that the simulator is also given the database values of the first keys in . Clearly we have that and . Now we prove the following lemma to show that the views of two adjacent games are indistinguishable, namely . 8 More formally, let be an algorithm that takes in input a view generated by a run of an adversary in our games and outputs 0 or 1 (we write it as ).
Lemma 1:
If is a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme, then for all adversaries it holds where is a negligible function.
Proof: Notice that for a fixed database and a set of adversary's queries the two games and differ only in a specific node : for the algorithms (the real ones or simulator's) used to create the commitment and to produce the related openings.
We show how to convert an efficient distinguisher into an algorithm that breaks one of the equivocation properties of the commitment scheme.
Given a database we distinguish for the node between two possible cases such that at least one of them occurs with probability at least 1/2: 1) in the real game would contain a soft commitment, 2) in the real game would contain an hard commitment.
In the first case a distinguisher for the two games and can be reduced to an adversary for the -SEquivocation while in the second case we can make a reduction to -HEquivocation.
Before starting the simulation makes a random guess about one of the two cases and then runs the appropriate simulation as follows. CASE 1. In this case has guessed that will contain a soft commitment and it plays the -SEquivocation game. Thus receives a pair of keys for the -mercurial commitment scheme and a commitment . It generates a pair of keys for the standard mercurial commitment and proceeds as follows. Operations for all nodes are simulated using and the appropriate algorithms according to their position in the tree. When gets to create , if (according to ) it has to be an hard commitment, aborts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise it sets . Then generates and gives them to its challenger to get back a soft opening of for each of these values. Such openings will be later used by to produce those proofs that "pass through"
. It is easy to see that if the -SEquivocation challenger has chosen (i.e., is fake), then is simulating game , otherwise it simulates . Let be the view produced in this simulation. At the end runs and outputs the same . CASE 2. In this game has guessed that will contain an hard commitment and it plays the -HEquivocation game. So receives a pair of keys for the -mercurial commitment scheme. It also generates a pair of keys for the standard mercurial commitment and proceeds as follows. Operations for all nodes are simulated using and the appropriate algorithms according to their position in the tree. When gets to create , it first generates using the fake algorithm and gives these values to its challenger. gets back a commitment and the hard and soft openings of to respectively. It sets and uses the received openings to produce those proofs that "pass through" . It is easy to see that if the -HEquivocation challenger has chosen , then is simulating game , otherwise it simulates . Let be the view produced in this simulation. When the game is over runs and outputs the same bit . In conclusion we have that Applying the result of Lemma 1 to all the games defined before we finally have that is negligible.
IV. TRAPDOOR -MERCURIAL COMMITMENT BASED ON SDH
In this section we show an efficient construction of a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme . Our construction relies on the SDH, introduced by Boneh and Boyen in [3] . Informally, the SDH assumption in bilinear groups of prime order states that, for every PPT algorithm and for a parameter , the following probability is negligible:
If we suppose that is a bilinear group generator which takes in input a security parameter , then (asymptotically) the SDH assumption holds for if the probability above is negligible in , for any polynomial in (see [3] for the formal definition).
The SDH assumption obviously implies the discrete logarithm assumption (i.e., if the former holds, so has to do the latter). A reduction in the other direction, however, is not known. Recently, however, Cheon [7] proved that, for many primes , the -SDH problem has computational complexity reduced by with respect to that of the discrete logarithm problem (in the same group). THE NEW SCHEME. Now we describe our proposed trapdoor -Mercurial Commitment scheme, in terms of its component algorithms , as defined in Section II-A.
The technical construction of the proposed scheme builds upon the simulator described in the security proof of the weak signature scheme given in [3] .
In what follows denotes a family of collision resistant hash functions whose range is .
• : the key generation algorithm runs a bilinear group generator for which the SDH assumption holds [3] to get back the description of groups and a bilinear map . Such groups share the same prime order . The description of the groups contains the group generators:
. The algorithm proceeds by picking a random integer and it sets . Next, it chooses a collision resistant hash function from . The public key is set as , while the trapdoor is : • : the hard commitment algorithm randomly selects and computes (the symbol denotes concatenation : the soft equivocation algorithm is the same as .
A. Properties of the Scheme
The correctness of the scheme can be easily verified by inspection. With the next theorem we show that the remaining properties of are realized as well.
Theorem 2 (Security of ):
Assuming that the SDH holds for and is a family of collision resistant hash functions, then is a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme.
Proof:
To prove the theorem we need to make sure that the proposed scheme is binding and hiding, in the sense discussed in Section II-A. We prove each property separately.
-mercurial binding. To prove the property we need to make sure that neither hard collisions nor soft ones are possible. We prove that it is infeasible to find any of such collisions under the SDH assumption for the bilinear group generator [3] and the collision resistance of the hash function .
Let us first consider soft collisions. Next we describe how to adapt the same proof for the case of hard collisions. SOFT COLLISIONS. Assume there exists an adversary that with non-negligible probability can find a soft collision. We show how to build a simulator that uses to solve the -SDH problem, or to break the collision resistance of , with probability at least . receives in input from its challenger a -tuple and the description of a hash function . The simulator runs on input such values as the public key of the -mercurial commitment scheme. Then with probability the adversary outputs such that:
is a commitment, , is a valid hard opening for to the message at position and is a valid soft opening for to of index . We distinguish two cases: 1) and ; 2) and . At least one of these cases occurs with probability at least . In the first case the simulator immediately has a collision for . In case 2 we show how to solve the -SDH problem.
Since we have that . Moreover, the correct verification of implies that thus . Using long division we can write the -degree polynomial as where is a polynomial of degree and . Thus we can write .
Hence first computes
Finally it computes and . The simulator gives to its challenger. It is easy to see that such pair breaks the -SDH assumption. Thus with non-negligible advantage can break either the -SDH assumption or the collision resistance of .
HARD COLLISIONS. Let us now assume there exists an adversary that, given the public key of a -mercurial commitment scheme, can find a hard collision with nonnegligible probability . Then we construct a simulator that either solves the -SDH problem or breaks the collision resistance of with probability at least . The simulator is similar to the one described above. The difference is that outputs: such that: is a commitment, are two different messages, is a valid hard opening for to of index and is a valid hard opening for to of index . Again we consider two cases: 1) and , 2) and . Case 1 is the same as before. In case 2, solves the -SDH problem as follows. Since and , it must be the case that ( , would lead to two different and ). Moreover, since the commitment scheme is proper from the valid hard opening for we can "extract" a valid soft opening for . Thus, using exactly the same argument described above, we break the SDH assumption.
Hiding and Equivocation. First notice that our commitment scheme is "proper" in the sense of [4] . In our scheme, a soft decommitment is implicitly contained in a hard one. Indeed, given a hard opening to a message at position and the public key , we are able to compute a valid soft decommitment to the message of index .
As observed in Section II.A, if a scheme is proper, -HEquivocation can be simplified by giving to the adversary only the hard openings for the messages it has chosen. Therefore, since our scheme has this property, we can apply such simplification to our proof. In both cases we will show that it is infeasible for an adversary to distinguish between a real commitment/decommitment tuple from a fake/equivocation one.
In the -HEquivocation game the adversary is asked to tell apart from It is easy to see that in both cases are uniformly random in and follow the same distribution. In the first tuple, they are chosen uniformly and at random, while in the second tuple they are distributed, respectively, as and , which were chosen uniformly and at random in . Thus the two distributions are indistinguishable.
The proof of indistinguishability for the -SEquivocation is trivial. Indeed, it is easy to see that the elements in the two distributions are distributed in exactly the same manner.
V. EFFICIENCY
In the previous section, we proposed a trapdoor -mercurial commitment scheme based on the SDH assumption. In order to build efficient zero knowledge EDB, we also use a trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme based on the Discrete Logarithm constructions given in [6] , [20] (the interested reader is deferred to Appendix B for a quick description of such a scheme). For our convenience, we consider an implementation of the scheme that allows us to use some of the parameter already in use for the scheme. In particular, we use from the public key of as the public key for . Combining the two schemes as described in Section III, we obtain an implementation of zero-knowledge EDB (based on the SDH problem) that allows for proofs that are significantly shorter than those produced by previous proposals.
In the following we propose a formal analysis of the space required by the proofs in our ZK-EDB construction and we compare it with the best known solution. To obtain indications about the time efficiency of the available schemes, a series of experimental tests on real implementations have been carried on. The resulting measures are reported later.
A. Space Analysis
Below we compare our proposal with the most efficient (in terms of space) implementation known so far, namely the one by Micali et al. [20] (MRK from now on, for short), when implemented over elliptic curves with short representation (the best already known solution in terms of space).
We measure efficiency in terms of the space taken by each proof. For both schemes, we assume that the universe has size and, that , for simplicity.
1) Groups Used in the Comparisons:
Following [11] we fix a security parameter to achieve bits of security. Specifically is realized as a subgroup of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field of size , where is an bits prime. If is a parameter called embedding degree, is a subgroup of and . In particular we consider elliptic curves with embedding degree and CM discriminant . As suggested in [11] , for the case of Type 3 groups (see [11] for details), such parameters enable to obtain elements of that have size twice the size of elements of . 2) Bandwidth Analysis: A proof of membership in our scheme contains: 1 mercurial hard-commitment and the related hard-opening for the leaf (we do not count the eventual associated value) together with -mercurial hard-commitments and -mercurial hard-openings (one for each level above the leaves, but the commitment is not necessary for the root). In this analysis we count the space in term of elements 9 of : a mercurial hard-commitment, as well as the related hard-opening, requires 2 elements, a -mercurial hard-commitment counts as 3 elements and the related hard-opening requires 2 elements with additional elements for the hash values of the sibling commitments. In this way, a proof of membership in our scheme requires elements. The proof of non-membership has the same kind of components but in the "soft" version: 1 mercurial soft-commitment (2 elements), 1 mercurial soft-opening (1 element),
-mercurial soft-commitment (3 elements for each) and -mercurial soft-opening (1 element for each). The total is elements. In MRK's scheme a proof of membership includes 2 mercurial hard-commitments (one for the node on the path and one for the brother) for each level different than the root (so levels) and 1 mercurial hard-opening for each possible level (so ). The total is elements. The "soft" versions of such components in a proof of nonmembership require a total of elements.
In both the schemes each element has size but, for our construction, we let vary. For such a choice of parameters we obtain the following results.
The scheme of Micali et al. requires 770 elements for proofs of membership and 641 for proofs of nonmembership. Results for our scheme are summarized in Table I .
Notice that our scheme produces proofs of nonmembership, that are always much shorter than the corresponding MRK proofs. The space required by our proofs of membership, on the other hand, compares favorably to MRK scheme only until , it gets slightly worse for , and much worse for larger values of . Thus, the choice of leads to proofs of membership that are (approximately) 33% shorter, and to proofs of non membership that are almost 73% shorter than MRK! Notice that such a choice of (i.e., ) keeps the scheme practical also in terms of length of the common reference string. Notice also that, according to our present knowledge of the SDH problem, it seems reasonable to consider the same security parameter for our scheme and for the MRK implementation. This is because Cheon [7] attack requires to be an upper-bound to a factor of either or in order to be effective. If one sets , as suggested in the table above, this would imply that one should increase the key size of at most 2 bits in the worst case. Thus using the same security parameter for both ours and MRK seems to be reasonable for all practical purposes.
B. Computational Experiments
For the sake of completeness and to get indications about the time efficiency, a series of computational experiments have been carried out. We consider three possible EDB constructions: the original MRK construction on a subgroup of residue classes of integers modulo a safe prime (MRK-MOD, in the follow), the same construction over elliptic curves (MRK-ECC, for short) and our construction using over the same elliptic curves. [25] . All the codes share the same level of optimization, using pre-computation to speed-up the operations where it is possible. 10 As in the previous analysis, the chosen security parameter is to achieve bits of security. As recommended in [23] , the MRK-MOD scheme uses a subgroup of order 256 bits with element representations of 3072 bits and the other two schemes use a subgroup of points on an elliptic curve of order 256 bits. 11 SHA-256 is used as collision resistant hash function. The machine used for tests has an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU at 2.4 GHz.
2) The Test Results: The goal of a first experiment is to study the time efficiency of the construction based on using different values for . During the tests an EDB with 200 elements with keys of 120 bits is committed and a series of queries (both for belonging and for non-belonging elements) and verifications of the resulting proofs are executed. The measures (in time and space) are reported in Table II . For the space occupation of the proofs, the optimal value determined through the previous formal analysis is clearly confirmed as a good choice. Such value looks a good compromise also for the time efficiency: it is optimal in several measures and quite good in the rest.
The goal of a second experiment is to compare (in time and space) the three considered schemes: the value is adopted in the construction based on . The results are summarized in Table III . The MRK-MOD is confirmed as the worst choice from almost all the points of view: its time efficiency is probably compromised by the large modulus required to satisfy the security level. Our proposal, in spite of the more complex underling structure, is computationally more efficient than the original MRK-MOD (but not than MRK-ECC). As stated before, it beats the competitors in the space efficiency. On the other hand, we 10 The sources of the tests are available upon request to the authors. 11 In the PBC library, the required elliptic curves is the "type F" that uses groups of order 256 bits, with elements representations of 256 bits for G and of 512 bits for G . To be more precise, the representation requires a further single bit to store the sign of the y component of the point.
have to note that the verification of non-membership proofs is quite slow in our construction: this is due to the pairing applications involved in that step. 12 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced and implemented the notion of trapdoor mercurial commitments. Our construction can be used to construct Zero-Knowledge Sets that allow for proofs that are much shorter than those obtained by previous work. It would be interesting to investigate if it is possible to come up with an even more efficient implementation of the new primitive. In particular, it would be very interesting to construct s that allow for openings whose length is independent of .
APPENDIX A TRAPDOOR MERCURIAL COMMITMENTS
A trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme is defined by the following set of algorithms: .
• : is a probabilistic algorithm that takes in input a security parameter and outputs a pair of public/private keys ; • : given a message , this algorithm computes a hard commitment to using the public key and returns some auxiliary information ; • : the hard opening algorithm produces a hard decommitment to the message correlated to ; • : the hard verification algorithm accepts (outputs 1) only if proves that is a hard commitment to ; • : produces a soft commitment and an auxiliary information . We observe that a soft commitment string is created to no message in particular;
• : produces a soft decommitment (also known as "tease") to a message . The parameter points out if corresponds to a hard commitment or to a soft commitment . A soft decommitment to says that "if the commitment produced together with can be opened at all, then it would open to "; • : checks if is a valid decommitment for to . If it outputs 1 and corresponds to a hard commitment to , then could be hard-opened to ; • : produces a "fake" commitment which at the beginning is not bound to any message. It also returns an auxiliary information ; • : the hard equivocation algorithm generates a hard decommitment for to the message . A fake commitment is quite similar to a soft commitment with the additional property that it can be hard-opened; • : generates a soft decommitment to using the auxiliary information produced by the algorithm.
To satisfy the correctness property we require that the following statements are false only with negligible probability: 1) if :
2) If :
3) If :
1) Security Properties:
We require that a trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme satisfies the following security properties:
• Mercurial binding. Having knowledge of , it is computationally infeasible for an algorithm to come up with such that either one of the following cases holds: -is a valid hard decommitment for to and is a valid hard decommitment for to , with . We call such case a "hard collision". -is a valid hard decommitment for to and is a valid soft decommitment for to , with . We call such case a "soft collision".
• Mercurial hiding. There exists no PPT adversary that, knowing , can find a message for which it can distinguish from , where and .
• Equivocations. There exists no PPT adversary that, having knowledge of the public key and the trapdoor key , can win in the following games with non-negligible probability. In such games must tell apart the "real" world from its corresponding "ideal" world. The challenger flips a binary coin . If it gives to a real commitment/decommitment tuple; if it gives to an ideal tuple produced using the fake algorithms. . It is easy to see that the mercurial hiding is implied by the HEquivocation. Moreover if the scheme is proper (i.e., the soft opening is a proper subset of the hard one), then the HEquivocation can be simplified by giving to the adversary only the hard opening . RELATION TO PREVIOUS DEFINITIONS. We observe that the definition of equivocations stated above is slightly different from the one in [4] where the authors define three equivocation properties: HHEquivocation, HSEquivocation and SSEquivocation. They claim that a mercurial commitment scheme that satisfies their definition satisfies also the one of Chase et al. [6] . The statement is true but what is not made clear in their paper is that, in order to make the proof valid, the scheme has to be proper. From a theoretical point of view the claim still holds for all schemes, as a non-proper mercurial commitment can be alway converted into a proper one: simply by defining the hard opening as the hard opening plus the soft opening. However this may be tricky in practice. First of all because if this is not said clearly one may use a non-proper scheme not being aware that it does not enjoy itself (i.e., without applying the conversion to proper) all the properties guaranteed by the Chase et al.'s definition (e.g., building ZKS). Second, if one has an efficient non-proper scheme, the conversion to proper may leak something in efficiency.
Therefore in our work we propose a slightly different definition that is more general than the one of Catalano et al. [4] . Our SEquivocation is the same as the SSEquivocation in [4] while our HEquivocation is like the HHEquivocation with the addition that we allow the adversary to receive also the soft opening of the challenge commitment. It is easy to see that our new definition implies the definition of Chase et al. [6] without any requirement on the properness of the scheme and thus it also allows to build ZKS directly (i.e., without any conversion) from any mercurial commitment scheme (proper and non-proper). Finally it still has the same nice property of the definition in [4] of being easy to prove, compared with the one in [6] .
APPENDIX B THE MRK TRAPDOOR MERCURIAL COMMITMENT SCHEME
Here we briefly describe the trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme based on the Discrete Logarithm Assumption given by Micali et al. in [20] , and later formalized by Chase et al. in [6] .
Let be a group of prime order in which the Discrete Logarithm is hard. The scheme is defined by the following algorithms:
• : the key generation algorithm selects a random generator , picks a random integer and sets . 
